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Abstract 
This paper discusses aspects related to competitiveness in the Invitations to Bid (ITBs) of the public tender for the concession of 
the urban bus public transport services in the Metropolitan Region of Recife (RMR), in the Brazilian Northeastern Region. The 
bids were conducted by three different public bodies - the Municipalities of Recife and Olinda and the State of Pernambuco. 
Basic features of the bidding terms are presented and some of their aspects that have jeopardized competition are pointed out, 
notably the small number of lots, the lack of diversification of the size of lots, the possibility of forming consortia with unlimited 
number of participants, and the ownership of depots. Hence, some criticisms towards the bidding terms are stated and in order to 
prove the criticisms it is shown a simulation of an arrangement amongst incumbents, based on the rules of the tenders 
themselves, in which the allocation of potential winners ex post bidding does not differ from the ex ante scenario. Since the 
biddings have already been concluded and their results confirm the arrangement simulated, and since their winners have not 
proposed any amount bellow the reserve prices, the main conclusion is that competitiveness was put on the jeopardy. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of CIT 2014. 
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1. Introduction 
Some previous Brazilian experiences on bidding terms targeting the delegation of urban bus systems have been 
presented by Rolim et al. (2010) who concluded those terms have jeopardized competitiveness. The main objective 
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of this article is to analyze whether the bidding terms of a new specific tendering process, namely the concession of 
the urban bus public transport services in the Metropolitan Region of Recife (STPP/RMR), have put competitiveness 
in jeopardy and to discuss the market structures ex ante and ex post the tendering process. The bidding was 
announced by the Greater Recife Transport Consortium (GRCT) - a public consortium comprising the municipalities 
of Recife and Olinda, two major cities of the Metropolitan Region of Recife (RMR), and the Government of the 
State of Pernambuco (Best, 2011). The dispute was long awaited since services have neither been awarded through 
tendering processes nor preceded by contracts and have been conducted based solely on service orders and been 
renewed under a “negotiated re-contracting” basis in the same pattern observed in other Brazilian cities (Santos et. 
al., 2005). Therefore, it is not only at odds with constitutional principles, but also not in compliance with adequate 
parameters of Economic Regulation. 
This paper is divided into: a) this introduction; b) a description of the features of the ITBs; c) an analyses of the 
features of the ITBs in the light of adequate principles aiming at fostering competition; d) a simulation of how 
inconsistencies identified in “c” may cause the ex post market structure to reproduce the ex ante structure due to the 
loss of competitiveness enabled by the bidding terms themselves; e) conclusions; and f) a reference list. 
The authors would like to state that the analysis in this paper is theirs alone and do not represent the official point 
of view of the institutions where they work. The authors also do not intend to suggest that their findings indicate the 
bidding terms violate any laws or rules. 
2. Main Features of the Bidding Terms 
The first attempt to bid the system was made through ITB 01/2013 but no bidder attended. Seven out of eight lots 
in which the STPP/RMR has been divided were simultaneously auctioned (the eighth lot had already been tendered). 
Due to the failure of the first process the Greater Recife Transport Consortium (GRCT) switched some conditions 
and split the bidding into two new biddings: ITB 02/2013, covering lots 1 and 2 [and comprising Bus Rapid Transit 
(BRT) corridors], and ITB 03/2013, comprising lots 3 to 7. The seven lots comprises 371 routes and prior to the 
ITBs seventeen companies were operating the whole system (their initials being BOA; CAX; CDA; AVC; EME; 
GLO; ITA; PED; ROL; ROD; RME; STA; SJT; SPA; TRC; VRC; VML). 
Figures from ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013 show the evolution of the number of passengers from 2011 to 2014 of 
the seven lots under dispute: 468,048,298 (2011); 474,763,208 (2012); 476,035,342 (2013, estimate); 497,782,670 
(2014, estimate). 
Table 1 presents the main features of ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013. The analyses further developed in sections 3 
and 4 will be based on these characteristics. 
Table 1: Main features of the bidding terms 
Feature Description 
Contract type fixed-price contract with economic price adjustment; the GRCT will make a per passenger payment 
(PRO) lower than the fare paid by passengers 
Bidding type (awarding criterion) the lowest per passenger payment (PRO) the operator charges the GRCT, limited to a reserve price 
(PROmax) set up in the bidding terms (each lot has a specific PROmax); it is a paper-based sealed 
bid tendering 
Fare setting method the GRCT sets a fare that should cover PRO and the expenses of the GRCT for managing the 
STPP/RMR 
Consortia companies are allowed to join as consortia with unlimited number of participants, provided that no 
more than 4 of them will be active operators of the system. In addition, the same company may not 
take part in more than one consortium 
Awarding constraints each bidder may submit proposals for as many lots as desired, but can only win one lot due to 
Pernambuco State Law 14,474/2011 that does not allow one operator to hold more than 20% of the 
system in order to avoid lock-in 
Demand risks demand risks are borne by bidders 
Contractual period 15 years, with the possibility of renew for another 5 years, since the performance indicators 
established in the bidding terms are met throughout the contract execution 
Estimated contractual value approximately USD 6.76 billion for the 7 lots during the initial 15 years 
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Feature Description 
Changes since the contracts will be comprised of lots of lines, rather than isolated lines, there may be 
contractual changes with creation and modification of lines within the bidding batches with two 
restrictions: a) each concessionaire may operate no more than 20% of the lines of the STPP / RMR 
(limit imposed by Pernambuco State Law 14.474/2011; b) contracts may not exceed their initial value 
in 25% (due to Federal Law 8,666/1993, art. 65, I, b), unless some unforeseen eventualities require 
deeper changes (Federal Law 8,666/1993, art. 65, I, a) 
Performance indicators fortnightly full payments conditional on concessionaires simultaneously meeting at least 90% of the 4 
contractual performance indicators: travel rate index; travel interval index, vehicle failure index, user 
satisfaction index 
Concessionaire’s flexibility at the 
operational level 
the GRCT establishes technical and operational parameters such as fleet, frequencies, times of 
operation, inspection 
3. Analysis and Criticism of Some of the Features Adopted in ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013 
It should be mentioned initially that the kind of analyses proposed here should be viewed in a systemic way since 
different parameters are simultaneously involved and even slight deviations from adequate principles in a single 
parameter may lead to pitfalls. It is always important to bear in mind that auction design matters (Klemperer, 2004).  
Hence, in the following subsections some features of the bidding terms are confronted with some assumptions 
considered as adequate practice, bearing in mind the search for competitiveness as a principle since its breach may 
result in hiring an inefficient company at higher prices (Dimitri et al., 2011; Albano et al., 2011a). In the analysis it 
was considered that issues such as ownership of depots, contractual terms, size of lots, and participation 
requirements are critical to maintaining contestability amongst incumbents (Santos, 2000).  
3.1. Competitive tendering format 
Assuming that procurement processes through negotiations are not allowed by Brazilian concession legislation, 
the debate remains whether the competitive tendering format better suited to the case is a sealed-bid tendering or an 
auction. ITB 02/2013 and ITB 03/2013 may be considered a procurement auction in which the auctioneer is a buyer 
and bidders are sellers who have costs of supplying the object (Klemperer, 1999). Nevertheless we have adopted a 
different approach to make comparisons easier so we have considered sealed bid tendering a competitive tendering 
process in which prices are submitted through sealed- bid tenders (being it paper-based or on line-based), and 
auction a dynamic descending competitive tendering price competition (Dimitri et al., 2011). 
The production costs of a contract involve two dimensions: private values and common values (Krishna, 2010). 
The latter relates to the ability of the company to identify and measure the different tasks to fulfil the contract, e.g. 
the composition of demand, while the former relates to the efficiency of the company in performing each task 
required by the contract (Albano et al., 2011b). Since knowing the degree of uncertainty about costs is fundamental, 
choosing the competitive tendering format depends on the degree of uncertainty present in these components. 
Albano et al. (2011b) state that in situations in which uncertainties regarding common values prevail auctions 
would be employed (since in these cases the dynamics of the bids would help generate information to competitors to 
mitigate the uncertainties); sealed bid tendering would be appropriate when uncertainties on private values prevail. 
Kagel and Levin (2002) reported that sealed bid tendering before uncertainties on common values (as it is the case 
since the risks of demand are assumed by competitors) do not lead to efficient outcomes and the magnitude of the 
winner's curse increases with the number of participants. In contrast a reduction in the number of participants in 
general reduces the competitiveness. Milgrom and Weber (1982) indicate that in the presence of affiliated 
information (as is also the case, since incumbents are interested in the bidding) the procurer benefits more from an 
auction than from a sealed bid tendering procedure. 
In turn, Klemperer (2004) mentions fiascos in auctions in which uncertainties involving common values prevailed 
and reports cases of extreme success (regarding both competitiveness and economy) in which a hybrid solution (the 
so called Anglo-Dutch auction) was employed, consisting of an initial auction followed by a sealed tendering. In this 
model inexperienced bidders may gather information produced by more experienced competitors during the 
dynamics of auction, hence enhancing competitiveness (Albano et al., 2011b). 
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Milgrom (2004) says that the main advantage of the Anglo-Dutch auction is its ability to attract more bidders. 
Another advantage of this auction is the lessening of the possibility of collusion. The benefits of this procedure were 
reaped by the British government in the auction for its 3G mobile phone spectrum (Klemperer, 2004). 
Thus it can be concluded that the adopted competitive tendering format in both ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013, 
despite being in accordance with Brazilian law, does not produce more efficient results and does not enhance 
competitiveness, suggesting a need for a revision of legislation to expand the formats allowed by law. 
3.2. Division into lots and the participation of consortia (joint bidding) 
In this paper the following assumptions suggested by GEIPOT (1999) are considered good practice: 
• the size of the lot is closely related to the construction of a competitive contestability environment; 
• the formation of lots with different sizes and complexities should be prioritised; 
• the search for lowest fares and best allocative efficiency; 
• the variation in lot size helps to ensure the contestability of the market; 
• the grouping of services in order to obtain benefits from bundling itineraries in the same geographic area; 
• the division of lots as a function of the number of vehicles and the technological and operational complexity of 
the routes; 
• the operation and the vehicular technological complexity increase with the size of the lot. 
Thus, since the RMR´s system was divided into 7 large lots, the recommendation of varying the size of the lots as 
a function of the number of routes and fleet was not followed. In addition, since there were neither small nor 
medium-sized lots, barriers to entry were raised, hampering the access of small or medium-sized companies. Thus, 
in order to survive these companies may have been tempted to bid jointly with larger ones through consortia, leaving 
competitiveness in jeopardy. In fact, Nash and Wolanski (2010) state that large lots are barriers to entry for small 
operators. For example, Gibson (2010) cites that in Wellington (NZ) it was envisaged extending the minimum 
number of buses from 60 to 86 for a lot to be considered large. On contrast, in ITB 02/2013 the smallest lot (lot 2) 
has 243 vehicles. Other figures are as follows: 429 (lot 7); 351 (lot 4), 406 (lot 3), 351 (lot 5), 366 (lot 6), 498 (lot 1). 
In addition to the GEIPOT (1999), the findings of Amaral et al. (2009), state among other reasons that the size of 
the lots alters the resulting competitiveness. According to those authors, better results were achieved in London than 
in several cities of France, since in the former the contests involved small batches and in the latter large ones. 
In order to mitigate the possibility of collusion (Grimm, 2011), the Auction Theory also establishes basic 
requirements for the division of an object into lots when the formation of consortia is allowed: 
• the number of lots should be smaller than the expected number of participants; 
• the number of possible combinations resulting from the various possible arrangements between the potential 
bidders should be smaller than the number of lots; 
• whenever it is impossible to set the number of lots smaller than the number of potential bidders (e.g. due to 
technical or geographical constraints), the number of lots should be increased (which implies smaller lots), so that 
small firms may face large firms. In addition, increasing the number of lots hampers coordination between 
bidders, thus fostering competitiveness. 
The requirements aforementioned are necessary, but not sufficient conditions, since collusion may occur even in 
situations in which the number of lots is smaller than the number of interested bidders (e.g. through rotation 
schemes, subcontracting agreements, multi-markets). 
In contrast to these requirements, ITB 02/2013 and ITB 03/2013 allow a scenario in which the number of possible 
arrangements amongst incumbent firms, taking into account the permission to form consortia with an unlimited 
number of components, is greater than the number of lots in dispute. Of course this poses a threat to competitiveness, 
due to a real possibility of collusion (Rolim et al., 2010) since there are 17 incumbents who may group into seven 
consortia and each win one lot (a simulation of this situation can be seen in section 4). 
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This threat to competitiveness is reinforced by the fact that a competitor may not be granted a number of routes 
that exceed 20% of total routes from the STPP/RMR (as established by Pernambuco State Law 14,474/2011). Thus, 
the ITBs clauses may cause the legislation to produce an opposite effect of its purpose (which was to avoid market 
concentration) since the bidding terms facilitate collusion, thus jeopardising competitiveness. 
It should be noted that one of the differences between ITB 02/2013 and ITB 03/2013 in comparison with the 
unsuccessful ITB 01/2013 is that the tendering was split into two stages. This measure, aiming to enhance 
competition, was be undermined by the bidding terms themselves for not diversifying the size and scale of the lots 
and for allowing the formation of consortia with an unlimited number of participants. 
3.3. Concessionaires’ (in)flexibility at the operational level 
The GRCT establishes technical and operational parameters such as fleet, frequencies, times of operation and 
inspection leaving no room for concessionaires to seek innovative ways to foster innovation (e.g. through strategies 
related to maintenance, personal scales, definitions of vehicle model, or travel schedules). Therefore, bidders have 
no way of differentiating their services from their competitors, since the public authority has imposed the way to 
provide the services in the bidding terms. This lack of flexibility ends up jeopardising competitiveness, as it affects 
efficiency. Santos et al. (2001) cite that good regulatory practice establishes that decisions regarding operational 
definitions should be left to the operators. Hence, the bidding terms do not adopt appropriate regulatory practice in 
this field as well. 
This lack of flexibility also benefits incumbents, who already have more knowledge of how they are assessed and 
enforced by GRCT during contractual execution. Thus, this aspect also undermines competitiveness. 
3.4. Lack of balance between the PROs of the seven lots 
The pricing model is designed as follows: 
• users pay a fare determined by the GRCT, which should cover the following expenses: 
I - the payment to the concessionaires; 
II - the maintenance of the economic and financial balancing of the concession; 
III - the costs arising from the management of the electronic ticketing system; 
V - the management of the STPP/RMR; 
VI - the costs involved in running integrated terminals, stations, and stops; 
VII - gratuities and allowances; 
• concessionaires will be paid according to the PRO they have tendered, limited to a reserve price (PROmax) set up 
by the GRCT in ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013. 
• since part of the STPP/RMR is comprised of an integrated system in which passengers switch buses inside 
integrated terminals without paying another fare, and the GRCT still lacks the technology to count the number of 
integrations between buses, the amount the GRCT will pay to the concessionaires corresponds to the number of 
ticketed passengers plus an estimated number of integrated passengers multiplied by the concessionaire’s PRO. 
To cover its expenses the GRCT earns an amount equal to the fare multiplied by the number of ticketed 
passengers. The balance between GRCT´s revenue and expenses has been met so far. 
USD 0.98 (Common fare for all  lots)
Lot 7 Lot 4 Lot 3 Lot 2 Lot 5 Lot 6 Lot 1
USD 0.71
PROmax  per Lot
USD 0.89
USD 0.92
USD 0.64
USD 0.70
USD 0.64
USD 0.80
 
Figure 1: Fare x PROmax per lot 
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Figure 1 compares the PROs of each lot against the common usual fare (fare A: USD 0.98) and could lead one to 
criticize the adoption of the same fare for the seven lots since production costs differ among lots (bearing in mind 
that each PRO reflects the production cost of its respective lot). In addition, this differentiation of production costs 
could indicate that the GRCT’s balances substantially differ among lots what could suggest that users of certain lots 
subsidize those of others. For instance, users from both lots 5 and 6 will pay the same fare (USD 0.98) whilst 
production costs in lot 6 are considerably lower than costs in lot 5. 
On the other hand, differentiating fares in a system that seeks integration is not feasible. Thus, the solution for the 
problem would comprise a review of the amount and distribution of lots, including the establishment of smaller lots 
(provided no imbalance in the system would occur) and greater flexibility in the types of buses (to meet the 
fluctuation of demand during operation) in order to achieve similar production costs among lots. This equalisation 
could benefit users, since in different lots users would pay fares in accordance with the operating costs of the 
respective lot, thus avoiding users of some lots subsidizing users of other lots. 
3.5. Contractual terms 
ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013 have adopted a 15-year term, renewable for another 5 years. Terms as long as this 
have been commonplace in many Brazilian biddings for the concession of the urban bus public transport services, as 
shown by Ferreira and Orrico Filho (2001) and Rolim et al. (2010). 
Augustin and Walter (2010) and Gibson (2010) cite that long terms can attract more bidders. However, long 
terms undermine both market contestability and the possibility of new bidders entering competition besides the 
incumbents in future rounds. It should be remembered that in urban bus systems it should be sought competition for 
the market rather than competition in the market. In other words, competitiveness through market contestability 
occurs in different but complementary ways: at the time of entry (i.e. through the bidding process), and through the 
possibility of both incumbents and new companies from outside the system having a chance to win the bidding 
processes, which in turn should be repeated frequently (Rolim, 2009). 
In addition, enforcement of regulations (e.g. surveillance, control, performance analysis) and short contractual 
terms would improve efficiency and cost savings. Otherwise, the longer the terms and the more lenient the 
enforcement the lower the competitiveness and the greater the tendency for the formation of cartels, with higher 
risks for the system (Santos et al., 2001). 
Current literature (Hensher and Wallis, 2005; GEIPOT, 1999; Rolim, 2009; Rolim and Brasileiro, 2009) 
recommends contractual terms of around 5 years, with occasional extensions to 7 years conditional on 
concessionaires’ compliance with performance indicators (Santos et al., 2001). Nash and Wolanski (2010) cite eight 
years as optimal terms (and this may even be lower, between 2 and 3 years, before the existence of a second-hand 
market for vehicles). Tukiainen (2008) estimated 4.78 years as the average length of terms for contracts in Helsinki. 
On contrast, terms such as those established in ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013 have been applied to the operation, the 
maintenance and to improvements of rail services (Nash and Wolanski, 2010), activities with significant sunk costs. 
It should also be stressed that the cash flow of the concession shows a 10-year period with an internal rate of 
return (IRR) of 8.95%. Nevertheless, the ITB established the contractual term for 15 years, with the possibility of 
extension for another five years conditional on compliance with some performance indicators. Thus, the 
extrapolation of the contract term beyond 10 years suggests impairment of competitiveness, as well as the 
establishment of inflated fares, besides not complying with the cash flow of the designed system itself. 
3.6. Depots 
Another barrier to the entry of new operators is raised by ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013 since ownership of depots is 
required to the bidder who win the tender. In addition, the RMR is a relatively highly densified area, property prices 
are at a quite high level, and each lot in which the system is split comprises large fleets (as stated in section 3.3) so 
finding large lots for depots is not an easy task for non incumbents. Hence, competition also results jeopardized 
because of this requirement. The unavailability of suitable locations can be a strong barrier to entry for new entrants 
(Gibson, 2010; Nash and Wolanski 2010). 
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4. Possible Market Structure Ex Post Analysis of the Bidding Model 
In this section it will be shown how the aforementioned inconsistencies in the terms of the ITBs may result in a 
market structure ex post bidding that reproduces the structure ex ante due to the lack of competitiveness that arises 
from the bidding terms themselves. It should be stated that both the knowledge of the ex ante market structure and 
the details of the ITB design are crucial to prevent the dispute from occasionally resulting in a fiasco (Klemperer, 
2004). Thus, the inconsistencies in the bidding terms may indicate that the contracting authority (GRCT) has not 
conducted an adequate study of the market structure. 
To analyze the proposed bidding model it is initially important to characterize how the incumbents would operate 
in the years 2011 and 2012, hence ex ante bidding. Therefore, Table 2 shows how current routes were distributed 
amongst incumbent operators and how these routes fit into the lots the system was split. The closest lots to the 
incumbents´ depots are shown as well. 
Table 2: Division of routes according to incumbent operators ex ante bidding 
N. Incumbent 
operator 
Closest lots 
to depots 
Main ex ante
lot 
Division and number of routes per lot (ex ante bidding) Ex antes 
number of 
routes 7 4 3 2 5 6 1 
1 BOA 7 7 31 6 16 - - - - 53 
2 CAX 6 6 - 3 3 2 - 35 4 47 
3 CDA 1 1 - - - 1 - - 29 30 
4 AVC 4 4 8 - - - - - - 8 
5 EME 3 3 - 7 32 - - - - 39 
6 GLO 5 5 - - - - 16 3 - 19 
7 ITA 1 1 - - - 1 4 1 39 45 
8 PED 5 5 - - - - 15 1 - 16 
9 ROL 1 1 - - - - - 1 - 1 
10 ROD 1 1 - - - - - 1 9 10 
11 RME 2 2 - - - 34 - - - 34 
12 STA 3 3 - 3 8 - - - - 11 
13 SJT 4 4 12 - - - - - - 12 
14 SPA 6 6 - - - - 2 16 - 18 
15 TRC 5 5 - - - 1 12 - - 13 
16 VRC 4 4 - 29 4 - - - - 33 
17 VML 3 3 - - 4 - - - - 4 
Total   51 48 67 39 49 58 81 393 
Based on the ITB clauses criticized in section 3 it is possible to speculate on an arrangement of incumbents in 
which each operator will win the routes in the area more closely located to their depots without a significant change 
in the percentage of routes operated by each company. Analyzing this scenario is fundamental since the location of 
depots constitutes a deciding factor when choosing which route to compete for, not only because proximity to depots 
facilitates daily operations, but also due to difficulties in obtaining large areas for depots. Table 3, drawn up in 
accordance with the requirements of the ITB, exhibits this possible ex post scenario. 
Table 3: Possible composition of incumbents by lot ex post bidding 
Nº. Incumbent 
operator 
Closest lots 
to depots 
Main ex 
ante lot 
Ex ante number 
of routes 
% of 
STPP/RM
R 
Ex post lot 
(possible 
composition) 
Ex post number 
of routes 
% of 
STPP/RMR 
Variation 
(%) 
1 BOA 7 7 53 13,49 7 53 14,29 0,80 
2 CAX 6 6 47 11,96 6 38 10,24 -1,72 
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Nº. Incumbent 
operator 
Closest lots 
to depots 
Main ex 
ante lot 
Ex ante number 
of routes 
% of 
STPP/RM
R 
Ex post lot 
(possible 
composition) 
Ex post number 
of routes 
% of 
STPP/RMR 
Variation 
(%) 
3 CDA 1 1 30 7,63 1 27 7,28 -0,36 
4 AVC 4 4 8 2,04 4 8 2,16 0,12 
5 EME 3 3 39 9,92 3 51 13,75 3,82 
6 GLO 5 5 19 4,83 5 17 4,58 -0,25 
7 ITA 1 1 45 11,45 1 37 9,97 -1,48 
8 PED 5 5 16 4,07 5 15 4,04 -0,03 
9 ROL 1 1 1 0,25 6 1 0,27 0,02 
10 ROD 1 1 10 2,54 1 8 2,16 -0,39 
11 RME 2 2 34 8,65 2 38 10,24 1,59 
12 STA 3 3 11 2,80 3 12 3,23 0,44 
13 SJT 4 4 12 3,05 4 11 2,96 -0,09 
14 SPA 6 6 18 4,58 6 15 4,04 -0,54 
15 TRC 5 5 13 3,31 5 12 3,23 -0,07 
16 VRC 4 4 33 8,40 4 24 6,47 -1,93 
17 VML 3 3 4 1,02 3 4 1,08 0,06 
Total   393 100,00  371 100,00  
From Table 3 it can be seen that, even without breaching the ITB clauses, it is possible to accommodate each 
incumbent into the lot their depots are nearer to, which in itself is quite a comfortable situation. It can also be noted 
that there is no significant variation in the number of routes allocated to each company ex ante and ex post tendering. 
It can thus be inferred that the ITB clauses do not hinder the emergence of collusion. 
The 17 incumbents can be considered as 12 potential bidders since 9 operators belong to 4 business groups what 
makes collusion behavior even easier to happen. The companies stated between brackets belong to the same business 
groups: [CAX; EME; RME]; [CDA; ROD]; [AVC; VRC]; [ROL; SPA]. 
ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013 also depicts incumbents’ revenue in the year 2011 and a projection of revenue for the 
years 2013 and 2014. Table 4 elaborates on information given in Table 3 and presents the composition according to 
the business groups the incumbents belong to. It can be seen that the composition allows all incumbents to benefit, 
thus confirming that the bidding terms leave competitiveness in jeopardy. 
Table 4: Revenue evolution per company per lot (2011-2014) according to the possible composition and to incumbent 
business groups incumbents 
Possible 
ex post 
lot 
Operator 
Number of 
routes 2011 
& 2012 
Number of 
routes 2014
Revenue 2011 
(USD) 
Revenue 2012 
(USD) 
Revenue 2013 
(USD) 
Revenue 2014 
(USD) 
Variation 
between 2011 e 
2014 
7 BOA 53 53 67,247,142 74,060,406 71,463,806 72,236,605 7,42% 
4 [AVC;VRC];SJT 53 43 50,909,417 55,231,844 38,984,304 42,222,674 -17,06% 
3 STA;VML;EME
RME 
CAX;[ROL; SPA]
153 159 150,563,031 165,317,312 178,885,215 192,113,109 27,60% 2 
6 
5 GLO;PED;TRC 48 44 45,677,051 49,202,747 49,556,247 49,556,247 8,49% 
1 [CDA;ROD];ITA 85 72 88,712,376 95,893,698 89,357,102 94,617,832 6,66% 
 Total 393 371 403,109,017 439,706,007 428,246,674 450,746,467 11,82% 
From the simulation in Table 4 it can be seen that only lot 4 represents a reduction in revenue between 2011 and 
2014, which could affect the possible composition. However, despite the small number of passengers in comparison 
to other companies, the greatest advantage for VRC and SJT would be no longer have to compete on the road in their 
main operation areas with larger companies (ex ante SJT competed with BOA, and ex ante VRC competed with 
BOA and EME). In addition, this accommodation would enable innovations in service and generation of demand for 
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these operators. It also should be stated that the ITB allows changes in the number of routes so the apparent loss of 
lot 4 may be mitigated through possible future changes to the contract. 
In addition, due to previous experience and observations on actual field operations, incumbents have less 
uncertainty about common values about demand than other competitors so they are in better conditions to predict the 
effects of the winner's curse (Albano et al., 2011b). Thus, even in a situation where the requirements of the ITB do 
not jeopardize competition, incumbents generally have inherent competitive advantages. McAfee et al. (2004) point 
out that the level of uncertainty for a new company is greater than for an incumbent, so new entrants feel compelled 
to take more risks thus facing competitive disadvantages. Thus, incumbents’ benefits are greatly increased when an 
ITB establishes rules that encourage their accommodation in consortia in which every potential bidder may profit. 
5. Actual results from ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013 
Table 5 shows the results so far from both ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013. 
Table 5: Results from both tenders 
Lot 7 4 3 2 5 6 1 
Incumbent(s) BOA AVC; SJT; 
VRC 
EME; STA; 
VML 
RME GLO; PED; 
TRC 
CAX; 
SPA 
CDA; ITA; 
ROL; ROD 
Bidder(s)(*) [BOA; 
SJT] 
VRC [EME; RBO] RME [GLO; PED; 
TRC] 
SPA; 
ROL; 
CAX 
[CDA; ITA; 
ROL; ROD] 
PROmax (USD) 0.89 0.64 0.71 0.70 0.92 0.64 0.80 
PRObidder(s) 
(USD) 
0.89 0.64 0.71 0.70 0.92 0.64 0.80 
(*) Companies listed between brackets bid as consortia. 
From table 5 it can be seen that, except for lot 6, each lot received just one proposal and each PRO proposed 
equals the reserve price (that means, the maximum PRO allowed) which indicates a lack of competitiveness. 
In addition it can be observed that the ex post and the ex ante picture will be very similar. Lot 7 will remain with 
BOA (SJT switched from lot 4 to lot 7), lot 2 with RME, lot 5 with GLO, PED and TRC, and lot 1 with CDA, ITA, 
ROL and ROD. AVC did not tender but it must be remembered that AVC and VRC belong to the same business 
group and VRC bid alone for lot 4. The picture is not clear in lot 6 since CAX and SPA did not group as consortium 
so one of them will not remain in the system (unless they merge in the future). RBO is a company that was one of 
the associates of BOA which now acts as a bidder itself (both companies still belong to the same business group). 
RBO constituted a consortium together with EME to tender for lot 3 and this joint bidding allowed its business group 
to run ex post the same routes they would run ex ante. Have RBO not bid by itself, its business group would not have 
bid for lot 3 due the restriction for a single company to bid for more than 20% of the system. 
Thus, from table 5 it may be concluded that the terms of ITB 02/2013 and 03/2013 have not enhanced 
competition and a very similar ex ante structure will be reproduced ex post the bidding process. 
6. Conclusions 
This article describes some aspects of ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013 regarding the concession the Public Transport 
Passenger Metropolitan Region of Recife (STPP/RMR) which ultimately jeopardized competition. 
The basic features of the ITB were presented initially, then it was assessed whether those aspects undermine 
competitiveness or not, notably the possibility of forming consortia with unlimited number of participants, the 
division into lots, the participation requirements, the competitive tendering format, the type of competitive tendering 
procedure adopted, the division into lots, the inflexibility imposed by the GRCT on operators at the operational 
level, the lack of balance between the PROs of several lots, the ownership of depots, each of which tend to 
jeopardize competitiveness to a greater or a lesser extent. 
In order to reinforce the criticism made to the ITBs it was presented a simulation of a possible arrangement 
amongst incumbents, based on the rules of the tender, in which the allocation of companies ex post bidding does not 
differ from the ex ante scenario. 
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Actual results from ITBs 02/2013 and 03/2013 show that competition have not enhanced and a very similar ex 
ante structure will be reproduced ex post the bidding process. It is thought that this fact alone is enough to justify the 
criticism developed throughout this article. 
Finally, it is noteworthy stating that the inadequate practices criticized in this article are not exclusive to the 
bidding conducted by the GRCT since some of them have been observed in recent biddings for delegation of public 
transportation by bus in other Brazilian cities as shown by Ferreira and Orrico Filho (2001) and Rolim et al. (2010). 
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